This is a bit of a longer read than usual, but, if you are interested in Ukrainian politics, I urge you to do so.

Even if the war ended tomorrow, the 91 borders of Ukraine were restored, and russia posed no threat, Ukraine would still face challenges, and has some major decisions in its future direction. There are pressing challenges for EU integration, for stability, for becoming for democratic, internal divides, and economic concerns. I will outline some of these key challenges and directions Ukraine must decide on, because to worry only about the war would be foolish, plans must be established, and this is my humble offering to the conversation. A lot of this is framed around EU aspirations.

In context, the challenges stem from a blend of shadows of the soviet legacy, the wild 90s and the rampant corruption and ineffective institutions that resulted, russia’s meddling (pre-2022) and then the actual full-scale invasion, the response to the war, and simply changes within society that are affecting everyone. Ukraine has made many steps, especially since 2014, to strengthen its capacities on many aspects politically. But, as we see even with the army, there are many who operate with a Soviet mindset: centralised decisions, relying on the old system which was made in the USSR or unable to think of anything different, corruption and a sense of pessimism, and ignoring uncomfortable realities. Identifying the problems, and considering the future directions, is an essential task for any Ukrainian or person who wishes to see Ukraine succeed and flourish. 

One thing you may wonder is that I have not singled out corruption, that is because some of the challenges and solutions will, in turn, tackle corruption. Too many so-called Ukraine experts love to say “CORRUPTION IS BAD” and offer nothing. Obviously, it’s bad. It is one of the major challenges for Ukraine, and everyone knows that. Even the corrupt people know that. The question is how to tackle it.

So, let’s get into the challenges and debates that must be addressed. 

Language Laws: Balancing Ukrainian Promotion With EU Requirements

As someone who wrote about the linguistic situation within Ukraine and its policies, I do have some credibility here. As I’ve written plenty of times now, Ukraine is a multilingual society, however, it is increasingly bound by the Ukrainian language, more than ever really. However, it is a reality that many people do speak Russian, at least privately, and there are Hungarian, Romanian, and other minority language speakers, and some complexes about language in the minds of some people. 

Note you can read my article here https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11212-023-09612-3

Ukraine’s government, present and future, is right to promote the Ukrainian language as a national one. It can foster an identify that was historically oppressed at different periods, resisting an imperialist mindset, and making Ukraine stand apart from Russia. In addition, it can allow for the coming together of people across the nation, even if they speak other languages at home or on the street. It is not accurate to claim that Russian, Hungarian, or Rusyn or whomever speakers are oppressed (it’s quite insulting to use that term.) However, there are certain limitations that need to be addressed.

If Ukraine wants to integrate and be part of the European Union, there must be legal protections of minority languages. This could include the ability for people to use state services in minority languages, schools, funding for languages etc. These languages would be, potentially, some of the Carpathian minority languages, and the minority languages of Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi, and Bessarabia (in Odessa oblast). The region of Berehove in Zakarpattia offers one interesting model, where Hungarian is legally allowed as a language of business, so long as written words are also in Ukrainian, and sellers offer services first in Ukrainian, or in practice at least switch to Ukrainian if requested. Protecting this approach for other languages could be a good step, and allowing for certain government services to operate with capacity for other languages can not only prevent marginalisation, but actually encourage Ukrainian, as people feel less isolated from the Ukrainian speaking community. For example, Lithuania permitted Lithuanian and Russian at schools, and Lithuanian proficiency went up because they were integrating, rather than isolated.  It also shows willingness to the EU for language protection. Schools could also permit a more liberal approach to allowing minority languages at secondary level, unlike now, and TV and film can have fewer linguistic restrictions in, at least, certain areas. There must be, of course, a balance, to not create isolated pockets of speakers who do not integrate or have no need to learn the national language, but there is potential to allow for Ukraine’s multilingual character shine through and strengthen unity. Many nations have other languages, united by one, and Ukraine could do so. However, the difference of Ukraine compared to former colonial powers is that Ukrainian itself has been under threat at different periods, so a stronger approach to promote it is justifiable. Nonetheless, achieving better integration is a core component of Ukraine’s future. 

Note, this would not include Russian, as it is not an official minority language and no one, since Yanukovych, has suggested making it so. There could be a case to make a Ukrainian Russian (similar to how there’s traditional Chinese vs simplified) or something similar, to simultaneously bring in Russian speakers but craft a firm distinction from Moscovian Russian. However, that is not a question for me to solve. I am focused more on the minority speakers, as they are more likely to be isolated, their languages were not spoken by the oppressors for most of history, and, purely from self-interest, relates to EU integration. 

2. Economics: Oligarchs and Growth

Ukraine has amazing potential economically. In fact, in 91 when the USSR collapsed, many expected Ukraine to be one of the most successful independent countries. Ukraine had abundant black soil, strong agriculture, robust industry, large population, minerals, a history of entrepreneurship, sea access and historical ties and positive relationships with many of its neighbours such as Turkey, Georgia etc. Sadly, this was not only untrue, but wildly so for a long time. Ukraine, while offering a booming IT industry, and still rich in resources, suffers from many economic woes: grey economy from tax avoidance, domination of oligarchs who influence society at many levels, low pensions and low government salaries, high taxes on many jobs, widening gap between those who work in finance or IT compared to the average worker (think 500 UAH a day for a cafe worker vs 3400 UAH for a developer), poor working legislation, distrusted regulatory institutions, and more (I spoke about that in a paper too). 

Ukraine has to make some major reforms economically. This would simultaneously cut itself from its Soviet past, but also adapt from the unregulated labour market which hurts many people. If Ukraine wants to be a capitalist utopia, with freedom of contract, low taxes etc. it has to have a strong rule of law, and protection for the vulnerable at least, to ensure a functioning society and cut down on isolation of the poor. Hence, taxes must be lowered on employees so they do not dodge taxes, people should be able to choose between being a contractor or a worker, taxes increased on the oligarchs, salaries increased, regulatory bodies abolished and started again with fresh faces not sour faced corrupt soviet minded grey bureaucrats, worker rights improved in line with EU standards, and foreign investment encouraged to facilitate growth. Ukraine has amazing economic potential, tech, industry, farming, tourism, etc. but it needs some investment to do so, and the benefits felt by all. Taxing the oligarchs out of existence would also do wonders for Ukrainian society. Many of these acts would help tackle the corruption that permeates a lot of Ukraine still. A major issue is the corrupted institutions. No matter how laissez faire or centralised your economic plan is, strong, healthy, accountable institutions are essential. This is a major challenge, solvable by overhauls, reforms, hiring, legal changes, and tax adjustments.

3. Returning to Peace Time: Gradual vs Rapid 

Any nation at war or in crisis has to suspend some of the usual liberties many of us around the world take for granted. It is a reality for its survival. Political power can be concentrated, freedoms of movement, business, expression, etc. can be waived in the name of defence, justifiably of course, but nonetheless. We may not even wish to claim it is a suspension of liberty overall, as without such suspension, liberty in the long run would be lost (a Russian takeover of Ukraine, for example).

However, there must be clear steps to return to a more free and democratic society. Border restrictions lifted on men, conscription for men over 25, the return of all democratic processes, emergency taxes dropped, and other laws and restrictions. Of course, this is all part of martial law, which will be cancelled, but it is important that people are mindful and demand this if anyone poses obstacles for their own interests. No this isn’t some subtle dig at Zelensky, I do trust him to do this, I am more thinking if some other leader took the reins one day for one reason or another. 

Ukraine has to consider its direction regarding the classic conflict of security and freedom. While of course many like to quote the line “a man who trades liberty for safety deserves neither and loses both” or whatever version of that they like, but there are real trade-offs Ukraine may have to consider. Will the draft remain in force? Do pro-russian voices remain excluded? How easy should it be to re-declare martial law? Do other restrictions remain in place for some time? Certainly, historically we have seen gradual return of freedoms after conflicts, even in the case of rationing in the UK after WW2 as a more mundane, but still real, example. So, the question will be, what rate does Ukraine return all freedoms to its citizens, and are there any that cannot be fully restored if war looms? This will depend somewhat on the nature of the peace of course, but this must be a conversation had at all levels. 

Even if it is relatively unanimously agreed to move away from the war society, the pace of which is a delicate question. Ukraine will, unfortunately, be aware that Russia may attempt to invade again, somewhat depending on how the war ends, and may be cautious to lift too many restrictions too fast, to make mobilisation easier. One of the problems when Ukraine was invaded was that there was not total preparation at all institutional and legal levels, or within society. This led to the swathes of southern territory being taken, the panic in evacuations, or lack of safe escapes for many and other issues. This must be avoided. I would suggest that, while certain freedoms must be restored immediately, especially politically, there could be a case for a limited conscription to remain in place or steady reforms of political participation, to avoid bad actors subverting elections.

4. Democratisation: More is Necessary

Speaking of democracy, we have to think about how Ukraine can improve its democracy. Ukraine routinely scores as a hybrid democracy, meaning, it is not a full or even partial democracy by many standards. Yes, citizens can vote, there are some robust protections of civil rights in the law, etc. However, there are still some issues. 

One is the dominance of the oligarchs in control of the media. There cannot be a true democracy without wider reform to ensure less elite control of TV and radio to give citizens the ability to inform themselves. Another is the lack of uncorrupted institutions, civil service inefficiency, and lack of large involvement in smalls cale, local politics and civil society bodies for boring, day to day, democratic functions (civil society is very strong, but it struggles in peace time in Ukraine to get the same motivation). The parties as well, are dominated by oligarchs, aside from Zelensky himself or smaller parties, and this needs to change. It is difficult without violating core liberties, but, some modifications of money in politics (limits to donations, better oversight of spending), higher salaries for lawmakers and local politicians to encourage normal people getting involved more without financial cost, overhauls of institutions and regulations (again, very important) to ensure against corruption, can all help. 

Further to this, more steps must be taken to encourage an active citizenry. Digital democracy can be a start, but political participation is essential. A huge part of this is the financial cost of political participation, as it takes time. Part of the solution is addressing the economic issues of Ukraine, but some considerations to encourage participation in civil society and local politics. Politics is gradual, day to day, deliberative. It cannot be merely voting every few years. Ukrainians are excellent at standing up for justice. However, this has to be translated into the dull, day to day of real political participation.

A fundamental problem is, perhaps anyway, the lack of a shared political culture. Many in Ukraine, having suffered the Soviet system and the oligarchal 90s and 00s, are suspicious of politics as an agent of positive change. Now, the full-scale invasion has actually done a lot to invigorate a shared political culture, respect for other citizens united in a common enemy. This must be reinvigorated and continued into peacetime, and a political culture built on mutual respect of fellow citizens and making a free and fair Ukraine, can help invigorate the motivation to get involved politically (though it will probably involve some clearing out of the institutions, again).

5. Civil and Political Freedoms Must be Increased

In relation to the question of returning freedoms, many more freedoms need increasing in my opinion. I make no secret; I have a strong libertarian impulse on civil and personal freedoms. Coincidentally, many Ukrainians do, a strong anti-authoritarian streek runs through Ukrainians, which has some negative effects (think the distrust of politics as a process, desire to avoid rules, etc.). There are, of course, some quite conservative attitudes, especially among the older, more rural and religious populations. For example, there’s some bizarre cases of a swingers party being raided by police, despite the fact it is all consenting adults doing whatever they want. Anti-pornography laws is another, as are instances of quite homophobic attitudes permeating decision making processes. Now, I do not believe that people should abandon their faith or views, even if I vehemently disagree, because, again, very libertarian in this area. However, governments should not be dictated by such views, they should protect the freedoms and rights of everyone. 

This, and also EU requirements, leads me to make the case that Ukraine must improve LGBT freedoms, other individual freedoms as well. For example, recreational drug use doesn’t have the same widespread usage as in western Europe or north America, however, it is there among younger and more alternative people, and should also head in a more liberal direction (though I do not think this is the top challenge by any means). LGBT rights, however, are pressing as many are fighting and dying for Ukraine, and deserve to share their assets with their same sex partners, have the same rights as opposite sex couples. Support is also growing, and it is something the government should support. Other civil and individual rights should be expanded to fit with the broad libertarian impulse of Ukraine and update to the 21st century. There can be too much influence of churches on teachers and school textbooks when it comes to sexual norms, issues surrounding women’s safety from abusive men, and a host of other problems from social conservatism, which frankly must give way as Ukraine modernises. I expect a backlash, of course, but if framed the right way, not as an attack on traditionally religious folk, but to respect everyone who has made sacrifices for the nation, it could work. 

6. Decentralisation vs Centralisation

Many have been concerned about the idea of political decentralisation within Ukraine, as in, giving more powers to oblasts or districts, out of fear of fracturing and separatism. It is an understandable worry. However, Ukraine is a big country with many different types of Ukrainian people. I believe there could be a case to be made for some decentralisation to give levels of power in certain legal areas to the oblast, rather than at the central Rada level.

There must be a lot of scrutiny as to what powers the local powers have, to avoid the concern of fracturing, however, many nations have this and remain united as a nation. It is more exploitable by foreign powers when there are larger grievances, and even centralised power can struggle to address this, as it leads to the sense of oppression or helps propaganda efforts at least say so. Letting regions or oblasts have slightly different language laws, laws on businesses, laws on other policies, could allow for the diversity of Ukraine to shine through without undermining core unity. Of course, the case for centralisation is strong, and few have an appetite for full federalisation. I am not advocating for that, necessarily. We could readily accept the need for a central state to guide reforms, ensure all persons have what they need and key freedoms protected by law. However, some decentralisation will make sense in a nation as large as Ukraine. 

7. Digitalisation: A Path Forward

Digitalisation is a great trend in Ukraine which has made life easier for many of its citizens. Via the Diia app you can: register for marriage, vote in political polls from the government, pay taxes, register businesses, and more. It can take power away from corrupt institutions, fosters engagement democratically, improves efficiency, and updates Ukraine’s infrastructure. That being said there are some improvements necessary.

One is for non-citizens. For non-Ukrainians, it is a headache to take advantage of many of the digital processes as they require passports, even if you are a permanent resident. If Ukraine wants to attract business and immigrants via digital processes, it needs to address this. Tax payments are another aspect which are more difficult for foreigners as well as is setting up a business.

There are also other functions which could be made digital. Registration of address (frankly, Ukraine neds to do away with it, many countries function without convoluted registration, in the UK we do…) would be one, registration for services like electricity, water etc., household information, transfers of property, even applications for visas and residence could have more online processes. I feel a lot of it would put notaries and two-bit lawyers out of work, well…good. The paperwork world seems cumbersome and daunting and takes too much time. It is a way to gut these old soviet civil servants and enter the modern era. You can still provide physical offices for the elderly, those without smart phones, disabled, and unique cases, but new, modern offices without sad faced bureaucrats.

That’s my list, which can probably grow, of some of the challenges and future directions Ukraine needs to consider pursuing. Big questions are raised as to what direction Ukraine wants to move in. But these conversations have to happen and a coherent direction pursued. Democracy needs involved citizenry, participation at many levels, slow, gradual, day in day out activities, an active civil society who continues not just in times of crisis, a shared political culture and norms that influence all decisions, and no domination of a particular group or elite. At this time, Ukraine still needs to improve, and it has the means. It is just a question of matching it with the will.